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Abstract
This paper examines how and to what extent parameter estimates can be biased in a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that omits the zero lower bound
constraint on the nominal interest rate. Our experiments show that most of the parame-
ter estimates in a standard sticky-price DSGE model are not biased although some biases
are detected in the estimates of the monetary policy parameters and the steady-state real
interest rate. Nevertheless, in our baseline experiment, these biases are so small that the
estimated impulse response functions are quite similar to the true impulse response func-
tions. However, as the probability of hitting the zero lower bound increases, the biases
in the parameter estimates become larger and can therefore lead to substantial dierences
between the estimated and true impulse responses.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have become a prominent tool for
policy analysis. In particular, following the development of Bayesian estimation and evalu-
ation techniques, estimated DSGE models have been extensively used by a range of policy
institutions, including central banks. At the same time, the zero lower bound constraint on
the nominal interest rates has been a primary concern for policymakers. Much work has been
devoted to understand how the economy works and how policy should be conducted in the
presence of this constraint from a theoretical perspective.1 However, empirical studies that
estimate DSGE models including the interest-rate lower bound are still scarce because of com-
putational diculties in the treatment of nonlinearity arising from the bound,2 and hence most
practitioners continue to estimate linearized DSGE models without explicitly considering the
lower bound.
This paper examines how and to what extent the estimates of structural parameters can
be biased in an estimated DSGE model where the existence of the interest-rate lower bound is
omitted in the estimation process. Suppose that there is a zero lower bound constraint in the
economy and that an econometrician ts a model without taking into account this constraint.
We would then expect the parameter estimates in the model to be biased. If signicant biases
were detected, it would cast some doubt on the common practice in which the zero lower bound
constraint is not explicitly taken into account and would motivate researchers toward the use
of an estimation procedure that deals with the constraint. Conversely, if the biases involved are
negligible, it would at least assure practitioners that their common practice leads to reliable
estimates in its own way.
More specically, we construct articial time series simulated from a standard sticky-price
DSGE model that incorporates an occasionally binding constraint on the nominal interest rate.
1See, for instance, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005), Adam and
Billi (2006, 2007), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), Aruoba and Schorfheide (2013), Bodenstein,
Guerrieri, and Gust (2013), Braun, Korber, and Waki (2012), Erceg and Linde (2012), Fernandez-Villaverde,
Gordon, Guerron-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramrez (2012), and Gavin, Keen, Richter, and Throckmorton (2013).
2A remarkable exception is Gust, Lopez-Salido, and Smith (2012) who estimate a nonlinear DSGE model in
which the interest-rate lower bound is occasionally binding. Based on the estimated model, they quantify the
eect of the zero lower bound constraint on the recent economic slump in the US.
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The parameters calibrated in this data generating process (DGP) are regarded as true values.
The solution algorithm follows from Erceg and Linde (2012) and Bodenstein, Guerrieri, and
Gust (2013).3 In their algorithm, if the model-implied nominal interest rate falls below zero, a
sequence of contractionary monetary policy shocks is added in both the current and anticipated
periods so that the contemporaneous and expected interest rates at the lower bound are zero.
Then, using the simulated data, the model is estimated without including the interest-rate
lower bound. In the estimation, we employ Bayesian methods, which are now extensively used
to estimate DSGE models. We set the prior means to the true parameter values and assess
the parameter biases from neglecting the lower bound by comparing the posterior means and
Bayesian credible intervals with the true values.
One could argue that the DGP in our analysis should be replaced with a fully nonlin-
ear model as in Braun, Korber, and Waki (2012), Fernandez-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerron-
Quintana, and Rubio-Ramrez (2012) or Gust, Lopez-Salido, and Smith (2012). However, if
the DGP is characterized by a fully nonlinear model, we cannot identify the source of parameter
bias: whether the exclusion of the interest-rate lower bound or the linearization of the model.
In this regard, the solution method employed in this paper is compatible with the standard
solution algorithms for linear rational expectations models, such as Blanchard and Kahn (1980)
and Sims (2002). Therefore, our analysis points to parameter bias only resulting from omitting
the zero lower bound constraint.
Our main results are summarized as follows. In the baseline economy, where the true value
for the steady-state real interest rate is calibrated such that the probability of hitting the zero
lower bound is about ve percent, we nd that most of the parameter estimates are not biased,
although some biases are detected in the estimates of the monetary policy parameters and the
steady-state real interest rate. We demonstrate that these biases in parameter estimates do
not amount to substantial biases in the estimates of the impulse response functions.4 However,
if the true parameter values in the DGP are altered such that the probability of binding at
the constraint increases, we show that the biases in the parameter estimates become larger
3These studies apply the method in Laseen and Svensson (2011), who propose a convenient algorithm to
construct policy projections conditional on alternative anticipated policy rate paths in linearized DSGE models.
4Our robustness analysis shows that these results hold even if we use a larger-scale DSGE model a la Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2007).
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and that the estimated impulse response functions can then substantially dier from the true
functions. This nding suggests that researchers in a very low interest rate environment should
make use of an estimation procedure that explicitly takes into account the zero lower bound.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the stylized DSGE
model used for our analysis and the solution algorithm that incorporates the occasionally
binding constraint on the nominal interest rate into the linear rational expectations system.
Section 3 explains the experimental design used for the analysis and presents our results.
Section 4 conducts a robustness analysis with a larger-scale DSGE model. Section 5 is the
conclusion.
2 The Model and Solution Method
This section describes the DGP used in our analysis. The DGP consists of a small-scale DSGE
model with sticky prices and a monetary policy rule. In order to incorporate the zero lower
bound constraint on the nominal interest rate, the model is solved using the method employed
in Erceg and Linde (2012) and Bodenstein, Guerrieri, and Gust (2013).
2.1 The Model
In the model economy, there are households, perfectly competitive nal-good rms, monopolis-
tically competitive intermediate-good rms that face price stickiness, and a monetary authority.
For empirical validity, the model features habit persistence in consumption preferences, price
indexation to recent past and steady-state ination, and monetary policy smoothing. A similar
model is used in Dennis (2004, 2009) and Milani and Treadwell (2012), among others.
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions are summarized as follows:5
~Yt =
1
1 + 
Et ~Yt+1 +

1 + 
~Yt 1   1  
 (1 + )
(~rnt  Et~t+1) + zdt ; (1)
~t =

1 + 
Et~t+1 +

1 + 
~t 1
+
(1  ) (1  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~Yt 1
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~rnt = max[r~r
n
t 1 + (1  r)

~t + y ~Yt

+ zrt ;   (r + )] (3)
5See the Appendix for the full description of the model.
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Eq. (1) is the spending Euler equation, where ~Yt, ~r
n
t and ~t are output, the nominal interest
rate, and ination in terms of the percentage deviations from their steady-state values, zdt is
a shock to households' preferences, interpreted as a demand shock,  2 [0; 1] is the degree of
habit persistence, and  > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Eq. (2) is the New Keynesian Phillips curve, where  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount
factor determined by the steady-state relationship  = =r, where  and r are the steady-state
gross ination and real interest rate respectively,  2 [0; 1] is the weight of price indexation
to recent past ination t 1 relative to steady-state ination ,  2 (0; 1) is the so called
Calvo parameter, which measures the degree of price stickiness, and  > 0 is the inverse of the
elasticity of labor supply. zpt is a cost-push shock.
Eq. (3) is a Taylor (1993) type monetary policy rule with the zero lower bound on the
nominal interest rate, where r 2 [0; 1) is the degree of interest rate smoothing,  > 1 and
y > 0 represent the degrees of interest rate policy responses to ination and output gap
respectively, zrt is a monetary policy shock, and  = 100(   1) and r = 100(r   1) are the
steady-state values for the real interest rate and ination, respectively. As ~rnt is expressed as
the deviation from the steady-state nominal interest rate r + , the max function constrains
the level of the nominal interest rate to be greater than or equal to zero.
Each shock zxt , x 2 fd; p; rg is governed by a stationary rst-order autoregressive process:
zxt = xz
x
t 1 + "
x
t ; (4)
where x 2 [0; 1) is an autoregressive coecient and "xt is a normally distributed innovation
with mean zero and standard deviation xn.
In the DGP, the percentage deviation of output from the steady state 100 log(Yt=Y ), the
ination rate 100 log t, and the nominal interest rate 100 log r
n
t are assumed to be observable.
Then, these observables are related to the model-implied variables by the following observation
equations: 26664
100 log(Yt=Y )
100 log t
100 log rnt
37775 =
26664
0

r + 
37775+
26664
~Yt
~t
~rt
37775 : (5)
5
2.2 Parameter Setting
The model is parameterized according to standard choices in the literature in order to make
our test economy as representative as possible. Table 1 summarizes our baseline parameter
setting.
The inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution  is set to be unity, so that the
households' preferences are characterized by the log-utility function. We assign the inverse of
the elasticity of labor supply  = 1. The habit persistence and price indexation parameters
are both set at 0.5. As is often the case in the New Keynesian literature, we set the Calvo
parameter  = 0:75, which implies that the average duration of prices is four quarters. The
monetary policy parameters ( = 1:5, y = 0:125) that represent the degrees of interest rate
responses to ination and output gap follow from the coecients in the original Taylor (1993)
rule, adapted to a quarterly frequency. The policy-smoothing parameter r is set to be 0:5. The
steady-state ination rate  is set at 0:5, implying that the central bank's target ination rate
is two percent annually. The steady-state value of the real interest rate (r = 0:5) is almost the
same as the average of the ex-post real interest rate calculated from the three-month Treasury
bill rate and changes in the GDP implicit deator in the post-1980s US sample.
For each shock, moderate persistency is assumed: d = 0:5, p = 0:5, r = 0:5. The
standard deviation of each shock (d = 0:25, p = 0:25, r = 0:25) is calibrated in line with
the prior mean often used in the literature that estimate similar DSGE models using Bayesian
methods.
2.3 Solution Method
The solution algorithm follows from Erceg and Linde (2012) and Bodenstein, Guerrieri, and
Gust (2012). They apply the method in Laseen and Svensson (2011), who propose a convenient
algorithm to construct policy projections conditional on alternative anticipated policy rate
paths in linearized DSGE models. This solution method is compatible with the standard
solution algorithms for linear rational expectations models, such as Blanchard and Kahn (1980)
and Sims (2002), and hence yields a straightforward interpretation about the implications of
the zero bound constraint.
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To be specic, Eq. (3) that includes the max operator is replaced with:
~rnt = r~r
n
t 1 + (1  r)

~t + y ~Yt

+ zrt +mt;
where mt is the contractionary monetary policy shock that enforces the zero lower bound
constraint. If the unconstrained nominal interest rate r++r~r
n
t 1+(1  r)

~t + y ~Yt

+zrt
(in terms of percentage level) falls below zero, a positive mt is endogenously determined so that
r +  + r~r
n
t 1 + (1  r)

~t + y ~Yt

+ zrt +mt = 0. We call this mt a binding shock.
mt should be treated not only as an unanticipated shock but also as an anticipated shock
given agents facing large negative shocks in the economy expect that the nominal interest rate
should be at the zero lower bound for some periods in the future. To take such expectation
channel into account, mt is extended as follows:
mt = m
1
t 1 + 
0
t
m1t = m
2
t 1 + 
1
t
m2t = m
3
t 1 + 
2
t
...
mK 1t = m
K
t 1 + 
K 1
t
mKt = 
K
t ;
where K is the maximum number of future periods in which the unconstrained monetary policy
rule implies the negative nominal interest rate. Based on this specication of the binding
shock, each kt , k = 0; 1; : : : ;K has an eect on Et~r
n
t+k since Etmt+k = 
k
t . Therefore, if
r++Et~r
n
t+k < 0 without the binding shocks, r++Et~r
n
t+k = 0 can be enforced by adjusting
kt . As these binding shocks are chosen depending on the state of the economy, the expected
duration of zero lower bound periods is endogenously determined. In practice, kt aects Et~r
n
t+k0
for k0 6= k because of the dynamic structure of the model, but we can exactly nd a set of kt
for k = 0; 1; : : : ;K that ensures the zero lower bound since there are as many binding shocks
as there are periods for the zero nominal interest rate.
3 Econometric Experiments
In this section, we conduct econometric experiments to examine how the parameter estimates
can be biased if the existence of the interest-rate lower bound is excluded in the estimation
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process. Moreover, we investigate the eects of these parameter biases on the model properties
by comparing the estimated impulse responses with those based on the true parameter values.
3.1 Design
Our experiments proceed as follows. First, we generate an articial time series of output
(deviation from the steady state), ination, and the nominal interest rate from the DGP as
described in the preceding section. Thus, the simulated series can be regarded as those that
reect the existence of the zero lower bound constraint. The simulated sample size is 200
observations, which corresponds to quarterly observations over a period of 50 years. This
sample size is chosen because it is comparable to that with which many researchers estimate
DSGE models in practice. According to a simulated sample using the baseline parameter
setting presented in Table 1, our model economy is at the zero lower bound for 5.5 percent
of quarters (11 periods of 200). This probability of hitting the interest-rate lower bound is
almost identical to that simulated in Fernandez-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerron-Quintana, and
Rubio-Ramrez (2012).
Next, using the simulated data, we estimate the DSGE model that consists of Eq. (1){(4)
together with the observation equations (5) without imposing the zero lower bound on the
nominal interest rate. In the estimation, we employ Bayesian methods. The prior distributions
of the model parameters are given in Table 2. As each prior mean is set to the corresponding
true parameter value used in generating the data, we can evaluate the parameter bias from
missing the lower bound constraint by examining how the resulting posterior mean and Bayesian
credible interval dier from the true value. To obtain the posterior distributions, we generate
500,000 draws using the random-walk Metropolis{Hastings algorithm and discard the rst half
of these draws.6
3.2 Results for Baseline Experiment
The second to fourth columns in Table 3 compare the true parameter values with the poste-
rior means and the 90 percent credible intervals for the estimated parameters in the baseline
6The scale factor for the jumping distribution in the Metropolis{Hastings algorithm is adjusted so that the
acceptance rate of candidate draws is approximately 25 percent. We use the Brooks and Gelman (1998) measure
to conrm the convergence of the posterior distributions.
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experiment. We can see that most of the estimated parameters are not biased as the posterior
mean estimates are very close to the true parameter values and the 90 percent credible intervals
contain the true values. This may be good news for many researchers in that the structural
parameters relating to preferences and nominal rigidities, the so-called deep parameters, are
not much aected by ignoring the interest-rate lower bound. However, we do detect some biases
in the estimates of parameters that characterize the monetary policy rule,  and r, and the
steady-state real interest rate r in the sense that the credible intervals for these parameters do
not include the true values.
An intuitive explanation for these biased estimates is the following. In the DGP, the
monetary policy reaction function has a kink where the interest-rate lower bound becomes
binding, that is, the reaction function has positive slopes with respect to ination, output, and
the lagged nominal interest rate if the unconstrained nominal interest rate is positive, but the
slopes become at if it is negative. However, when such a kink is omitted in the estimation
process, as is the case in our experiment, the estimated slopes are approximated to lie between
the positive and at slopes in the DGP, and thus the parameters in the monetary policy rule
can be underestimated. In our experiment, the biases emerge as a change in the estimate of
 and r, although the estimate of y could also be potentially aected. The reason for the
upward bias in the estimate of r is also straightforward. The presence of the interest-rate lower
bound forces the nominal interest rate to be equal or greater than zero. However, if the model
estimation fails to consider the zero lower bound, the nominal interest rate can be negative,
and the mean of the model-implied nominal interest rate declines. Then, the estimate of the
steady-state nominal interest rate must rise to adjust the dierence between the mean of the
model-implied nominal interest rate and that of the corresponding series simulated from the
DGP with the lower bound, given the model is log-linearized around the steady state. In this
experiment, such an adjustment has mostly emerged as a change in the estimate of r,7 rather
than . These causes of the parameter biases could have some inuence on the estimates of
the other structural parameters that characterize the Euler equation and the Phillips curve as
we apply the system-based estimation approach. However, our experiment has revealed that
such inuence is quite limited.
7A change in r aects the subjective discount factor  through the steady-state relationship  = =r and the
denition r = r=100 + 1, but the resulting change in  is quite marginal in its magnitude.
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Our baseline experiment is based on the posterior estimates for a sample of 200 observations.
We cannot deny the possibility that the parameter biases described above may arise because
of the small sample, and that sampling variability could lead to dierent biases, regardless of
the exclusion of the interest-rate lower bound. To mitigate the eect of small sample bias,
we conduct an experiment using a large sample of 5,000 observations generated from the same
DGP. The estimation results are presented in the last two columns in Table 3. As in the baseline
experiment, signicant biases are found in the estimates of the monetary policy parameters, 
and r, and the steady-state real interest rate r, and the credible intervals for these parameters
do not contain the true values. The other structural parameters are not much biased in that
the posterior mean estimates are quite similar to the true parameter values.8 Therefore, the
baseline results are not altered in this experiment.
An important issue is whether the parameter biases detected in the present experiment
can lead to a sizeable dierence in the implications of the model. To investigate this issue, we
compare the impulse response functions estimated without considering the interest-rate lower
bound with those computed using the true parameter values. Figure 1 depicts the impulse
responses of output, ination, and the nominal interest rate to one standard deviation shocks
in demand, cost-push, and monetary policy. The responses are expressed in terms of the
percentage deviation from the steady state in order to focus on the changes in the transmission
of shocks.9 In each panel, the solid thick line represents the true response, and the solid thin
line and dashed lines are respectively the posterior mean and 90 percent credible interval for
the estimated response. Throughout the gure, although small dierences are found between
the mean estimates and the true response, all the credible intervals include the true responses.
Therefore, we can conclude that the parameter biases in the baseline experiment do not amount
to substantial biases in the impulse response functions.
8The credible intervals for some of the parameters do not include their true values, but the mean estimates
themselves are not much dierent from the true values. Thus, we do not assess that these parameter estimates
are signicantly biased in this experiment.
9The estimated responses of the nominal interest rates in level terms are obviously dierent from the true
responses as the estimate of the steady-state real interest rate is biased.
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3.3 Results for Alternative Experiments
According to the simulated time series in our baseline experiment, the nominal interest rate
is bounded at zero for 5.5 percent of quarters. As the probability of hitting the zero lower
bound increases in the DGP, it could be possible that parameter biases from excluding the
bound in the estimation become large. To analyze such a possibility, we change the parameters
assigned to the DGP so that the model economy is more frequently constrained by the interest-
rate lower bound. We then conduct the same estimation exercises as the baseline experiment
using the data simulated by the DGP with the alternative parameter settings. Specically,
we consider two cases. One is where the true steady-state real interest rate falls by 0.25 (one
percent annually) so that r = 0:25. The other is where the standard deviation of the demand
shock increases to twice its size so that d = 0:5. The latter case increases the number of zero
interest rate periods because large negative shocks are more likely to depress the economy and
to lower the nominal interest rate. In both cases, the probability of hitting the lower bound
doubles, that is, they are now 11 percent of the simulated sample.
The middle two columns in Table 4 present the posterior means and the 90 percent credible
intervals for the parameters in the experiment where the true parameter value for the real
interest rate decreases to r = 0:25. As is the case with the baseline experiment, the estimates
of the monetary policy parameter  and the steady-state real interest rate r exhibit substantial
biases. In contrast, the posterior mean estimate of the policy smoothing parameter r is almost
the same as the true value. Instead, signicant biases are found in the autoregressive coecient
r and the standard deviation r of the monetary policy shock. However, the other estimates
are not very biased in the sense that the posterior credible intervals include their corresponding
true values. Figure 2 graphs the estimated and true impulse responses in order to examine the
eects of these parameter biases on the model properties. Compared with the responses in the
baseline experiment, the dierences between the mean estimates and the true responses become
large in most of the panels. In particular, the credible intervals for the output responses to the
cost-push and monetary policy shocks and the ination response to the monetary policy shock
do not contain the true responses in the rst ve periods.
The last two columns in Table 4 provide the posterior means and 90 percent credible
intervals for the parameters in the experiment where the true standard deviation of the demand
shock increases to d = 0:5. The estimates of the monetary policy parameters,  and r, and
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the steady-state real interest rate r exhibit larger biases than those in the baseline experiment.
In addition, signicant biases are found in y, r and r, which are all related to monetary
policy, and the credible intervals for these parameters do not include the true values. As in
the previous experiment, the estimates of the other parameter estimates are not very biased.
According to the impulse responses presented in Figure 3, the true responses are outside the
credible intervals in the rst few periods regarding the response of the nominal interest rate to
the demand shock and the responses of output and ination to the cost-push shock.
On the basis of the two experiments above, the parameters estimated without considering
the zero lower bound constraint may not be suciently accurate to replicate the true economic
dynamics.
4 Robustness Analysis
While we have employed a small-scale DSGE model in our analysis, an increased number of
policy institutions are actively developing and estimating larger-scale DSGE models a la Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2007). Thus, as a robustness analysis, we conduct a similar exercise as in
the preceding section using a version of the Smets and Wouters (2007) model.
4.1 Smets{Wouters Type Model
The model employed in this section is a slightly simplied version of the Smets and Wouters
(2007) model. This version diers from their original model in the following three aspects. First,
for the purpose of comparison with our baseline experiment, the monetary policy rule is replaced
with the one specied in our baseline model whereas Smets and Wouters employ a generalized
Taylor rule in which the policy rate is adjusted in response to the level and changes in the
theoretical output gap (i.e., the gap between real output and output that would be obtained
in the absence of nominal rigidities) in addition to ination. Second, our structural shocks
are all governed by stationary rst-order autoregressive processes and their disturbances are
mutually uncorrelated with each other. In the Smets{Wouters model, the exogenous spending
disturbance is aected by a contemporaneous innovation to total factor productivity (TFP)
and the price and wage markup disturbances follow ARMA(1,1) processes. Third, as in the
baseline experiment, the binding shocks mt are incorporated into the monetary policy rule in
12
order to take account of the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate in the
DGP.
The model consists of the following log-linearized equations.10 In what follows, all the
variables are expressed in terms of their percentage deviation from the steady-state balanced
growth path.
~ct =
=
1 + =
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1
1 + =
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Eq. (6) is the consumption Euler equation, where ~ct denotes consumption, ~lt is labor input,
10See the appendix to Smets and Wouters (2007) for a full description of the model.
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~rt is the short-term nominal interest rate, ~t is the ination rate, "
b
t captures the risk premium
shock in the return on assets held by households,  is the degree of external habit persistence
in consumption preferences,  is the steady-state growth rate, c is the degree of relative risk
aversion, and whl=c is the steady-state value of labor relative to consumption. Eq. (7) is the
investment adjustment equation, where ~{t represents investment, ~qt denotes the real value of
the existing capital stock, "it represents the shock to investment eciency,  is the subjective
discount factor, and ' is the steady-state elasticity of investment adjustment costs. Eq. (8) is
the no-arbitrage condition for the value of capital, where ~rkt is the real rental rate of capital,
 is the depreciation rate of capital, and rk is the steady-state real rental rate of capital.
Eq. (9) is the Cobb{Douglas production function with xed costs where ~yt denotes output,
~kst is eective capital services, "
a
t represents the TFP shock, p is one plus the share of xed
costs in output,  is the share of capital in production. Eq. (10) gives the eective capital
services used in production, where ~zt and ~kt 1 denote the capital utilization rate and capital
installed in the previous period. Eq. (11) is the condition for the capital utilization rate,
where  is determined by a function of the steady-state elasticity of the rate adjustment costs.
Eq. (12) is the capital accumulation equation. Eq. (13) is the aggregate resource constraint,
where "gt represents the exogenous spending shock, cy; iy; ky are the steady-state output ratios
of consumption, investment, and capital. Eq. (14) is the equation for the price markup ~pt ,
where ~wt is the real wage. Eq. (15) is the New Keynesian Phillips curve, where "
p
t represents
the price markup shock, p and p are the degrees of price stickiness and price indexation to
past ination, (p   1) is the steady-state goods market markup, and "p is the curvature of
the Kimball (1995) goods market aggregator. Eq. (16) is the condition for capital and labor
inputs in production. Eq. (17) is the equation for the wage markup ~wt , where l is the inverse
elasticity of labor supply. Eq. (18) is the wage equation, where "wt represents the wage markup
shock, w and w are the degrees of wage stickiness and wage indexation to past ination,
(w   1) is the steady-state labor market markup, and "w is the curvature of the Kimball
(1995) labor market aggregator. Eq. (19) is the monetary policy rule, where rr is the degree
of interest rate smoothing, r and ry represent the degrees of interest rate policy responses to
ination and output gap, respectively, "rt is the monetary policy shock, and mt is the binding
shock.
There are seven structural shocks in the model. Each of them "xt , x 2 fa; b; g; i; r; p; wg
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follows
"xt = x"
x
t 1 + 
x
t ; 
x
t  i.i.d. N(0; 2x)
where x is an autoregressive coecient and 
x
t is a normally distributed innovation with mean
zero and standard deviation x.
The observation equations are26666666666666664
100 log Yt
100 logCt
100 log It
100 logWt
100 log lt
100 logPt
100 log rt
37777777777777775
=
26666666666666664




l

r
37777777777777775
+
26666666666666664
~yt   ~yt 1 + "at
~ct   ~ct 1 + "at
~{t   ~{t 1 + "at
~wt   ~wt 1 + "at
~lt
~t
~rt
37777777777777775
;
where  = 100( 1), l is the steady-state hours worked,  = 100( 1), and r = 100( 1c 
1).
4.2 Parameter Setting and Prior Distribution
The true parameter values that characterize the DGP basically follow from the prior means
used in Smets and Wouters (2007), but some are changed so that the resulting probability of
hitting the interest-rate lower bound is comparable (12 periods of 200) to that in our baseline
experiment. To be specic, the steady-state ination rate  is changed from 0.625 to 0.5, and
the standard deviations of the structural shocks x, x 2 fa; b; g; i; r; p; wg are all changed from
0.1 to 0.3.
Then, the model without the zero lower bound constraint is estimated using the articial
time series generated from the DGP presented above. The second to fourth columns in Table
5 summarize the prior distributions of parameters used for the estimation in the present ex-
periment. As in the preceding experiments, each prior mean is set to the corresponding true
parameter value. For the standard deviations of the prior distributions, we use the same values
as set in Smets and Wouters (2007).
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4.3 Results for the Robustness Experiment
The last two columns in Table 5 show the posterior means and 90 percent credible intervals for
the estimated parameters in the Smets{Wouters type model. As in the baseline experiment,
most of the posterior mean estimates are almost the same as the true parameter values. How-
ever, substantial biases are detected in the estimates of the elasticity of investment adjustment
costs ' and the monetary policy response to ination r, that is, the 90 percent credible in-
tervals for these two estimates do not contain their corresponding true values. The intuition
about the bias in ' is as follows. Without considering the interest-rate lower bound in the
estimation, the model-implied interest rate series is biased. As the transmission eect of the
change in the interest rate on investment is quite strong, the parameter ' that characterizes
the relationship between investment and the interest rate has to be biased in order to t to the
investment series generated from the DGP. Regarding the biases in r, the same explanation
as provided in the previous section applies.
Figure 4 compares the estimated and true impulse responses of output, ination, and the
nominal interest rate to one standard deviation shocks regarding the TFP, the risk premium,
external demand, investment, monetary policy, the price markup, and the wage markup. As
with the preceding experiments, in each panel, the solid thick line represents the true response,
the solid thin and dashed lines are respectively the posterior mean and 90 percent credible
interval for the estimated response, and the responses are shown in terms of the percentage
deviation from the steady state. A remarkable nding here is that as shown in almost all of the
panels, the true responses lie in the estimated credible intervals, although some of the mean
estimates dier from the true responses. Therefore, we reach the same conclusion as in the
baseline experiment that the parameter biases from ignoring the zero lower bound constraint
only have quite marginal eects on the properties of the model.
5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the parameter biases in an estimated DSGE model that excludes the
existence of the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate. To this end, we have
conducted econometric experiments using a standard sticky-price DSGE model. According
to the results in our baseline experiment, some biases are detected in the estimates of the
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monetary policy parameters and the steady-state real interest rate, but the estimates of the
other structural parameters are not biased. However, we have demonstrated that the parameter
biases become large with the increased probability of hitting the zero lower bound. The last
nding cautions researchers against the common practice of estimating linearized DSGE models
without considering the lower bound.
However, as Braun, Korber, and Waki (2012) and Gust, Lopez-Salido, and Smith (2012)
suggest, the solution algorithm in which nonlinearity is considered only in monetary policy rules
but the remaining equilibrium conditions are linearized may lead to an inaccurate assessment of
the lower bound constraint. In this regard, it is an important research agenda to examine how
parameter estimates in linearized DSGE models can be aected by ignoring the true economic
structures characterized by fully nonlinear models.
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Appendix
This appendix presents the full description of the model. In the model economy, there are a
continuum of households, a representative nal-good rm, a continuum of intermediate-good
rms, and a monetary authority.
Each household h 2 [0; 1] consumes nal goods Ch;t, supplies labor lh;t, and purchases
one-period riskless bonds Bh;t so as to maximize the utility function
E0
1X
t=0
t
"
(Ch;t   Ct 1)1 
1    
l1+h;t
1 + 
#
subject to the budget constraint
PtCh;t +Bh;t = PtWtlh;t + r
n
t 1Bh;t 1 + Th;t;
where Et is the expectation operator conditional on information available in period t,  2
(0; 1) is the subjective discount factor,  > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution,  2 [0; 1] is the degree of external habit persistence in consumption preferences,
 > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply, Pt is the price of nal goods, Wt is the
real wage, rnt is the gross nominal interest rate, and Th;t is the sum of a lump-sum public
transfer and prots received from rms. The rst-order conditions for optimal decisions on
consumption, labor supply, and bond-holding are identical among households and therefore
become
t = (Ct   Ct 1)  ; (A.1)
Wt =
lt
t
; (A.2)
1 = Et
t+1
t
rnt
t+1
; (A.3)
where t is the marginal utility of consumption and t = Pt=Pt 1 denotes gross ination.
The representative nal-good rm produces output Yt under perfect competition by choos-
ing a combination of intermediate inputs fYf;tg so as to maximize prot PtYt  
R 1
0 Pf;tYf;tdf
subject to a CES production technology Yt =
R 1
0 Y
1=(1+p)
f;t df
1+p
, where Pf;t is the price of
intermediate good f and p  0 denotes the intermediate-good price markup. The rst-order
condition for prot maximization yields the nal-good rm's demand for intermediate good
f , Yf;t = Yt (Pf;t=Pt)
 (1+p)=p , while perfect competition in the nal-good market leads to
Pt =
R 1
0 P
 1=p
f;t df
 p
.
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Each intermediate-good rm f produces one kind of dierentiated goods Yf;t under monop-
olistic competition by choosing a cost-minimizing labor input lt given the real wage Wt subject
to the production function
Yf;t = Atlf;t;
where At represents the exogenous technology level. The rst-order condition for cost mini-
mization shows that real marginal cost is identical among intermediate-good rms and is given
by
mct =
Wt
At
: (A.4)
In the face of the nal-good rm's demand and marginal cost, the intermediate-good rms
set prices of their products on a staggered basis as in Calvo (1983). In each period, a fraction
1    2 (0; 1) of intermediate-good rms re-optimize their prices while the remaining fraction
 indexes prices to a weighted average of past ination t 1 and steady-state ination . The
rms that re-optimize their prices in the current period then maximize expected prot
Et
1X
j=0
j
jt+j
t
"
Pf;t
Pt+j
jY
k=1
 
t+k 1
1  mct+j#Yf;t+j
subject to the nal-good rm's demand
Yf;t+j = Yt+j
"
Pf;t
Pt+j
jY
k=1
 
t+k 1
1 #  1+pp ;
where  2 (0; 1) denotes the weight of price indexation to past ination relative to steady-state
ination. The rst-order condition for the reoptimized price P ot is given by
Et
1X
j=0
8>>>>><>>>>>:
()j
t+j
t
Yt+j
"
P ot
Pt
jY
k=1
t+k 1

 
t+k
#  1+p
p

"
P ot
Pt
jY
k=1
t+k 1

 
t+k
  (1 + p)mct+j
#
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
= 0: (A.5)
Moreover, the nal-good's price Pt =
R 1
0 P
 1=p
f;t df
 p
can be rewritten as
1 = (1  )

P ot
Pt
  1
p
+ 
t 1

 
t
  1
p
: (A.6)
The nal-good market clearing condition is
Yt = Ct; (A.7)
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while the labor market clearing condition leads to
Ytdt
At
=
Z 1
0
lf;tdf = lt; (A.8)
where dt =
R 1
0 (Pf;t=Pt)
 (1+p)=p df represents price dispersion across the intermediate-good
rms. Note that this dispersion is of second-order under the staggered price setting and that
its steady-state value is unity.
A monetary policy rule is specied as
log rnt = max

r log r
n
t 1 + (1  r)

log rn +  log
t

+ y log
Yt
Y

+ zrt ; 0

: (A.9)
In the absence of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, the monetary authority
adjusts the interest rate following a Taylor (1993) type monetary policy rule where r 2 [0; 1)
is the degree of interest rate smoothing, rn is the steady-state gross nominal interest rate,
and ; y  0 are the degrees of interest rate policy responses to ination and output. zrt is a
monetary policy shock, which captures unsystematic components of monetary policy.
The equilibrium conditions are (A.1){(A.9). Log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions
around the steady state and rearranging the resulting equations yields Eq. (1){(3). The demand
shock zdt and cost shock z
p
t have been introduced in a reduced form manner, and interpreted
as a shock to consumption preferences and time-varying price markup of intermediate-goods
respectively.
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Table 1: Parameter setting
Parameter Economic interpretation Assigned value
 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1.000
 Inverse of elasticity of labor supply 1.000
 Habit persistence 0.500
 Price indexation 0.500
 Price stickiness 0.750
 Policy response to ination 1.500
y Policy response to output 0.125
r Interest rate smoothing 0.500
 Steady-state ination rate 0.500
r Steady-state real interest rate 0.500
d Persistence of demand shock 0.500
p Persistence of cost shock 0.500
r Persistence of policy shock 0.500
d Standard deviation of demand shock 0.250
p Standard deviation of cost shock 0.250
r Standard deviation of policy shock 0.250
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Table 2: Prior distributions
Parameter Distribution Mean Standard deviation
 Gamma 1.000 0.150
 Gamma 1.000 0.150
 Beta 0.500 0.150
 Beta 0.750 0.150
 Beta 0.500 0.150
 Gamma 1.500 0.150
y Gamma 0.125 0.150
r Beta 0.500 0.150
 Gamma 0.500 0.150
r Gamma 0.500 0.150
d Beta 0.500 0.150
p Beta 0.500 0.150
r Beta 0.500 0.150
d Inverse Gamma 0.250 2.000
p Inverse Gamma 0.250 2.000
r Inverse Gamma 0.250 2.000
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Table 3: Posterior distributions of parameters in baseline experiment
Baseline Large sample
Parameter True value Mean 90% interval Mean 90% interval
 1.000 1.054 [0.829, 1.278] 1.041 [0.950, 1.132]
 1.000 1.002 [0.752, 1.240] 1.005 [0.761, 1.250]
 0.500 0.439 [0.303, 0.582] 0.467 [0.434, 0.501]
 0.750 0.757 [0.686, 0.826] 0.785 [0.765, 0.806]
 0.500 0.495 [0.288, 0.693] 0.479 [0.413, 0.541]
 1.500 1.293 [1.107, 1.472] 1.216 [1.158, 1.272]
y 0.125 0.156 [0.000, 0.273] 0.125 [0.094, 0.156]
r 0.500 0.404 [0.340, 0.466] 0.455 [0.440, 0.469]
 0.500 0.474 [0.344, 0.595] 0.470 [0.442, 0.498]
r 0.500 0.594 [0.514, 0.673] 0.539 [0.522, 0.556]
d 0.500 0.470 [0.322, 0.623] 0.516 [0.482, 0.550]
p 0.500 0.498 [0.346, 0.647] 0.466 [0.415, 0.515]
r 0.500 0.518 [0.412, 0.623] 0.498 [0.474, 0.522]
d 0.250 0.265 [0.217, 0.310] 0.237 [0.227, 0.247]
p 0.250 0.240 [0.187, 0.295] 0.228 [0.216, 0.240]
r 0.250 0.281 [0.240, 0.319] 0.253 [0.245, 0.261]
Notes: In the baseline, the model is estimated using a sample of 200 observations. In the large sample case, the
same model is estimated using a sample of 5,000 observations.
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Table 4: Posterior distributions of parameters in alternative experiments
Case of low r Case of large d
Parameter True value Mean 90% interval Mean 90% interval
 1.000 1.086 [0.855, 1.326] 0.953 [0.731, 1.175]
 1.000 0.997 [0.761, 1.248] 0.994 [0.746, 1.232]
 0.500 0.421 [0.290, 0.546] 0.432 [0.308, 0.558]
 0.750 0.762 [0.701, 0.818] 0.764 [0.723, 0.807]
 0.500 0.432 [0.269, 0.596] 0.391 [0.237, 0.541]
 1.500 1.279 [1.053, 1.492] 1.197 [1.035, 1.346]
y 0.125 0.410 [0.000, 0.823] 0.055 [0.023, 0.077]
r 0.500 0.505 [0.409, 0.598] 0.329 [0.264, 0.391]
 0.500 0.413 [0.266, 0.560] 0.471 [0.307, 0.628]
r 0.250 0.343 [0.231, 0.461] - -
r 0.500 - - 0.722 [0.617, 0.831]
d 0.500 0.527 [0.415, 0.643] 0.516 [0.403, 0.634]
p 0.500 0.486 [0.349, 0.622] 0.615 [0.498, 0.733]
r 0.500 0.642 [0.583, 0.702] 0.642 [0.557, 0.727]
d 0.500 - - 0.438 [0.355, 0.516]
d 0.250 0.266 [0.220, 0.310] - -
p 0.250 0.253 [0.194, 0.315] 0.203 [0.162, 0.243]
r 0.250 0.426 [0.337, 0.515] 0.302 [0.264, 0.338]
Notes: In the case of low r, the true values are set at r = 0:25 and d = 0:25. In the case of large d, the true
values are set at r = 0:5 and d = 0:5.
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Table 5: Prior and posterior distributions of parameters in the Smets{Wouters type model
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Parameter Distribution Mean S.D. Mean 90% interval
' Normal 4.000 1.500 4.852 [4.071, 5.641]
c Normal 1.500 0.375 1.468 [1.304, 1.622]
 Beta 0.700 0.100 0.728 [0.685, 0.769]
w Beta 0.500 0.100 0.503 [0.442, 0.559]
l Normal 2.000 0.750 1.502 [0.741, 2.279]
p Beta 0.500 0.100 0.500 [0.449, 0.553]
w Beta 0.500 0.150 0.420 [0.284, 0.557]
p Beta 0.500 0.150 0.459 [0.343, 0.574]
 Beta 0.500 0.150 0.482 [0.424, 0.540]
p Normal 1.250 0.125 1.231 [1.182, 1.279]
r Normal 1.500 0.250 1.208 [1.015, 1.384]
 Beta 0.750 0.100 0.721 [0.674, 0.767]
ry Normal 0.125 0.050 0.093 [0.033, 0.152]
 Gamma 0.500 0.100 0.500 [0.363, 0.626]
100( 1   1) Gamma 0.250 0.100 0.191 [0.087, 0.291]
l Normal 0.000 2.000 -0.210 [-0.673, 0.241]
 Normal 0.400 0.100 0.399 [0.397, 0.402]
 Normal 0.300 0.050 0.287 [0.259, 0.315]
a Beta 0.500 0.200 0.557 [0.468, 0.649]
b Beta 0.500 0.200 0.499 [0.416, 0.590]
g Beta 0.500 0.200 0.481 [0.374, 0.583]
i Beta 0.500 0.200 0.489 [0.384, 0.590]
r Beta 0.500 0.200 0.482 [0.379, 0.583]
p Beta 0.500 0.200 0.520 [0.406, 0.642]
w Beta 0.500 0.200 0.445 [0.339, 0.544]
a Inv. Gamma 0.300 2.000 0.314 [0.286, 0.343]
b Inv. Gamma 0.300 2.000 0.318 [0.266, 0.370]
g Inv. Gamma 0.300 2.000 0.303 [0.276, 0.328]
i Inv. Gamma 0.300 2.000 0.278 [0.237, 0.320]
r Inv. Gamma 0.300 2.000 0.290 [0.262, 0.317]
p Inv. Gamma 0.300 2.000 0.312 [0.266, 0.356]
w Inv. Gamma 0.300 2.000 0.308 [0.263, 0.352]
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Figure 1: Impulse responses in baseline experiment
(1) Demand shock
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(2) Cost-push shock
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(3) Monetary policy shock
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Notes: The gure shows the impulse responses of output, ination, and the nominal interest rate (in terms of
the percentage deviation from the steady state) to one standard deviation demand, cost-push, and monetary
policy shocks. The solid thick lines represent the true responses, and the solid thin lines and dashed lines are
respectively the posterior means and 90 percent credible intervals for the estimated responses.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses in alternative case I (r = 0:25)
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(2) Cost-push shock
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(3) Monetary policy shock
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Notes: The gure shows the impulse responses of output, ination, and the nominal interest rate (in terms of
the percentage deviation from the steady state) to one standard deviation demand, cost-push, and monetary
policy shocks. The solid thick lines represent the true responses, and the solid thin lines and dashed lines are
respectively the posterior means and 90 percent credible intervals for the estimated responses.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses in alternative case II (d = 0:5)
(1) Demand shock
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(2) Cost-push shock
0 5 10 15
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
Output
0 5 10 15
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Inflation
0 5 10 15
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Nominal interest rate
(3) Monetary policy shock
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Notes: The gure shows the impulse responses of output, ination, and the nominal interest rate (in terms of
the percentage deviation from the steady state) to one standard deviation demand, cost-push, and monetary
policy shocks. The solid thick lines represent the true responses, and the solid thin lines and dashed lines are
respectively the posterior means and 90 percent credible intervals for the estimated responses.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses in robustness analysis
(1) TFP shock
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(2) Risk premium shock
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(3) External demand shock
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(4) Investment shock
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(5) Monetary policy shock
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(6) Price markup shock
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(7) Wage markup shock
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Notes: The gure shows the impulse responses of output, ination, and the nominal interest rate (in terms of
the percentage deviation from the steady state) to one standard deviation shocks in the TFP, the risk
premium, external demand, investment, monetary policy, the price markup, and the wage markup. The solid
thick lines represent the true responses, and the solid thin lines and dashed lines are respectively the posterior
means and 90 percent credible intervals for the estimated responses.
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